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Abstract
If a government imposes a tax on capital income, it may, as a result, lower
the private rate of return on capital below the growth rate of an economy,
thereby giving rise to the possibility of running a permanent decit. Since,
however, the before-tax rate of return and not the after-tax rate of return is
relevant for judging the dynamical eciency of the economy, the possibility of a
permanent decit does not by itself imply a possibility for a Pareto-improving
redistribution of income.
To examine this issue \step by step", we examine in general whether a
government can run a decit forever by rolling over its debt. Assuming the
government to run a decit in each period equal to a constant fraction of to-
tal output, we study several overlapping generations models, proceeding from
endowment economies to neoclassical growth with a variable capital stock. We
then introduce capital income taxation and show, for example, that permanent
decits are feasible in the case of a variable capital stock, provided the capi-
tal income tax is suciently high. We examine the welfare eects and discuss
policy consequences.
An early draft of this paper was written while the author was an assistant professor at Princeton
University I am grateful in particular to Abhijit Banerjee, Ben Bernanke, Timothy Besley, Henning
Bohn, John Campbell, Glenn Donaldson, Jon Faust and Jim Hines for helpful comments.
Harald Uhlig, CentER, Tilburg University, Postbus 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, THE NETHERLANDS,
uhlig@kub.nl, Fax: (+31) 13 - 4663066.
1\I place economy among the rst and most important virtues and public
debt as the greatest of dangers to be feared. To perserve our independence,
we must not let our rulers load us with perpetual debt. If we run into such
debts, we must be taxed in our meat and drink, in our necessitites and in
our comforts, in our labor and in our amusements. If we can prevent the
government from wasting the labor of the people, under the pretense of
caring for them, they will be happy." (Thomas Jeerson)
1 Introduction.
Arguably the most visible part of Reagans legacy is the budget decit. The reasons
for why it is of concern to many need not be repeated here. They have been discussed
already by, say, Krugman, 1990, Buiter and Kletzer (1992b), Eisner (1992), Friedman
(1992), Vickrey (1992). Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotliko (1994) use generational
accounting to evaluate this issue, which in turn has been critized by Buiter (1993).
Several of the arguments brought forward, however, state, that we need not worry.
For example, some argue that a good part of the decit corresponds to government
investment and may be therefore a good thing after all: the decit, corrected for
this fact, is then actually quite a bit smaller (see Eisner, (1986)). Some claim, that
because parents care about their children, it does not matter whether government
expenditures are nanced by taxes or by debt (Barro,1974).
Finally, it is sometimes heard that we may just grow out of the decit over time.
Suppose, there is a government decit and the interest rate is not \too high". Then,
over time, even though the real value of the debt rises, the output of the economy
may rise even faster, trivializing the debt through the enlarged tax base. Indeed,
in this case, there is even room for a Pareto-improving redistribution which makes
everybody better o, since providing each generation with a \free", decit-nanced
lunch and then simply rolling over this debt forever is feasible. The crucial issue
then is, whether indeed a permanent decit is sustainable. For a recent book-length
contribution regarding this argument and the related literature, see Carlberg (1995).
An empirical investigation is in Bovenberg and Petersen (1992).
We reexamine this last point of view in the context of four versions of a basic
overlapping generations model, adding one by one three relevant features: capital,
investment and depreciation, and capital income taxation. This paper is thus an
exercise in model engineering: by moving from a simple to a complicated framework
2step by step, it becomes transparent how the individual parts in the nal machinery
interact and contribute to the analysis.
In the very basic endowment economy, the government can run a decit forever
if the decit as a fraction of GNP is not too high. Intuitively, debt here fullls the
role of money in other overlapping generations models. The result here corresponds
to standard results about seignorage (see Wallace, 1980). For the second of the four
models, we add a xed capital stock which is traded from generation to generation.
Since the value of the capital stock rises with the growth rate, so too must the value of
government bonds. The total, outstanding decit then explodes, thereby eliminating
the possibility of a sustainable decit.
We then add the possibility for capital income taxation (or, equivalently, savings
taxation) to the instruments of the government, where the returns on private capital
are taxed. The emphasis here is on this distortionary aspect of taxation, in contrast
to the analysis in, say, Buiter and Patel (1992a) or Buiter and Kletzer (1994). A
higher capital income tax drives down the realized rate of return on capital, possibly
rendering the decit sustainable. The necessary tax rate for accomplishing this is
typically quite sizeable: even as the decit-to-GNP ratio becomes negligible, the
capital income tax does not. The intuition behind this result is that the capital
income tax needs to drive the interest rate down to at most the growth rate of the
economy in order to have sustainable decits at all. It turns out that for most tax
rate, there is a \good" and a \bad" steady state equilibrium. Though there is some
choice for the tax rate, the tax rate can only be chosen so that the good equilibrium
becomes better when the bad equilibrium becomes worse at the same time.
Finally, we make the capital stock variable by introducing investment and de-
preciation. Since the model is a neoclassical growth model in nature, there will not
be any growth eects. However, the level eects resulting from the dierent capital
income taxes which make a government decit sustainable, can be quite dramatic.
The welfare eects are much less clear cut. Furthermore, a positive capital income
tax may not be necessary for sustainability, if the economy without the government
is already dynamically inecient: this is demonstrated in a numerical example.
This paper is a variation of Diamonds (1965) celebrated analysis. Since rolling
over the debt amounts to the creation of a bubble, this paper can also be viewed as
an application of the bubble literature as in Tirole (1985) or Blanchard and Fisher
(1989). However, while the focus there and in Diamond (1973) as well as Atkinson
and Sandmo (1980) is on the normative aspects of government policy, the focus here is
on the positive aspect. The question is not, whether government should run a decit
3forever, but whether it can. Note that sustainability of a permanent decit means
that the interest rate is below the growth rate of the economy and that therefore
the economy is dynamically inecient: from a welfare perspective, there is always
a Pareto improving redistribution, which, depending on the structure of the model,
may or may not require a decit (see Cass (1972), Balasko and Shell (1980), Sargent
(1987) and Abel et al. (1989)). The sad fact is that permanent decits seem to be
politically attractive. The point of this paper is then to analyze what happens, given
that a permanent decit needs to be sustained.
This paper is related to Sargent and Wallace (1981), Darby (1984), Miller and
Sargent (1984) and Aiyagari (1985). All of these papers, however, consider at most
a savings technology with a xed rate of return instead of a productive capital stock
with a rate of return calculated from equilibrium conditions and taxes are lump sum,
if introduced at all. In that respect, Chari (1988), Lucas (1990) and Bohn (1990) are
more closely related, but they use an innite-lived agent framework.
Finally, it should be emphasize, that the entire analysis proceeds in the context
of a closed economy. Open economy issues make capital income taxation a much
more tricky issue, and many additional problems may arise. For some of the related
literature, see Bovenberg (1989, 1992) and Broer, Westerhout and Bovenberg (1994).
2 Model 1: No capital.
In each period t, t =1 ;2 ;::, a new generation of N two-period lived agents is born.
There also is a generation of N initially old agents alive at date 1. The eects of
population growth, general excess demand functions or distributional issues are not
examined here. N is chosen to equal one, keeping in mind that each agent is meant
to be representative of his generation and therefore does not act strategically.
There is one consumption good each period. An agent born at t cares about
consumption c1t when young and c2t+1 when old according to the utility function
u(c1;c 2)=l o g ( c 1)+l o g ( c 2) :
The specic form has been chosen to make the results easy and tractable. Observe
that a discount factor is not included: again, this keeps the algebra simple. The
special form for the utility function implies a vertical savings line in Diamonds (1965)
diagram 1, thereby ruling out his \perverse case".
The agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young, which he can use to
4produce the consumption good according to the production function
yt = tnt;






is some given constant. Since labor is supplied inelastically, it follows that the growth
rate γ of the economy is given by γ − 1, where
γ = 
(the symbol γ is introduced to keep the notation consistent throughout the paper).
There is a government, who tries to nance a decit in each period by rolling over
its debt. We assume that the governmental decit is a constant fraction  of total
output,
gt = y t ;
where >0. If Rt is the return (i.e. one plus the interest rate) from period t − 1t o
t , the government budget constraint is given by
bt = gt + Rtbt−1; (1)
where bt are the one-period bonds issued by the government in time t. Note that the
decit is nanced entirely by rolling over the debt. There are no income taxes and
the like, since they are not the issue here (it is easy to append the model by having
some kind of income tax, nancing some government expenditures in excess of the
decit described above: in that case, the output yt is to be read as the after | tax
income). The results stay the same.




bt = y t
s t = y t
R t = R;
5each agent maximizes its utility at savings st, given the gross return Rt+1 = R,t h e
government budget constraint is satised and markets clear:
1. the consumption goods market
c1t + c2t + gt = yt (2)
2. the bond market
st = bt: (3)
It is easily shown that the savings of a young agent are given by
st = yt= 2;
independently of the interest rate (which makes the logarithmic specication of the
utility function so convenient for our purposes). Thus, the remaining constants  and
R can be calculated from (1) or (2), given  : one equation suces by Walras' law.
The result is given by
R=γ =1 − 2 
=1 = 2 :
Since R>0 is required for the steady state equilibrium, it follows, that <1 = 2
is necessary and sucient for a steady state equilibrium to exist. These results are
summarized by
Proposition 1 If there is no capital, any permanent decit up to 50 % of total output
each period is sustainable by rolling over the debt.
Note, that the number of 50 % is simply the total savings of the agent in the
model economy. This number is not meant to be interpreted as describing the actual
situation in any particular country and depends critically on the specication of the
utility function. A result of this type, however, probably holds for a wide variety
of utility functions. The proposition seems like good news for politicians: optimal-
ity questions aside, it is at least possible to sustain a sizeable decit forever. The
question, of course, is, whether a crucial element is missing in deriving this answer
to the sustainability question by making the model possibly too simple. That this is
probably so should already be indicated by the following observation in the model.
6Proposition 2 If there is no capital, the size of the total outstanding debt is inde-
pendent from the government decit, as long as it is sustainable.
This proposition simply follows, because  =1 = 2 is independent of  (or R,f o r
that matter). This proposition runs counter to the intuition one usually has about
the size of a government decit: one would think that a larger yearly decit implies
a larger outstanding stock of debt. The reason that the model here does not deliver
such a result is simple: government bonds are the only means of cross-generational
trade in this model. Government bonds act like money and the government decit
like seignorage or an inﬂation tax: while these are disturbing the amount an old agent
will receive, it will not change the amount a young agent wants to save due to the
logarithmic specication of the utility function. Thus, savings and not the size of
the budget decit is what determines the amount of outstanding debt (compare to
Sargent (1987)).
It can be concluded that this model is indeed too simple to give a reliable insight
into the question of the sustainability of permanent decits. Therefore, another el-
ement needs to be added: a dierent vehicle for saving. More precisely, a privately
owned capital stock is added as a feature of the model in the next section.
3 Model 2: xed capital stock, no capital income
tax.
Let there be a xed capital stock k>0, which does not depreciate over time. Pro-




where  2 (0 ; 1 ) is the share of capital, a constant. The capital is owned by the
old, who sell it to the young for a total price of qt. The young receive wage for their
labor, spend part of it on consumption c1t, part of it on saving in capital skt and part
of it in saving in governmental bonds sbt. When old, they receive the dividends from
their capital holdings as well as the resale price and they are paid the interest on their
bonds.
All markets are competitive. In particular, in order for any government bonds to
be hold, it must be the case that the return on government bonds and on capital are
the same in equilibrium. Furthermore, it is straightforward to calculate that the wage
7income is given by (1−)yt and the dividend income by yt, which we will substitute
into the denition.




it is the case that
1. for each t, t =1 ; 2 ;:::, the agent born at t, maximizes his utility at c1t and
c2t+1 = Rt+1st, given the budget constraint:
c1t + st =( 1− ) y t;
2. the government budget constraint is satised:
bt = gt + Rtbt−1
3. markets clear:
(a) the consumption goods market
c1t + c2t + gt = yt
(b) the capital market
st = qt + bt;
4. no arbitrage:
Rt =( y t+q t) =qt−1; (4)
where qt > 0a n dR t>0 :
The condition b0  0 ensures that the government cannot start up the economy
by handing a liability to the old agents, which they may trade from generation to
generation. The restrictions qt > 0a n dR t>0 are the usual positivity restrictions on
prices. Finally, (4) is the restriction that the return on government bonds and capital
must be equal (since the decit is assumed to be strictly positive, this restriction must
hold except for degenerate cases). This is called a no arbitrage condition, because
that is its economic interpretation. It is of course possible to write the denition of
an equilibrium without this condition and derive it from a more elaborate description
of the maximization problem for the agents. Since this step is straightforward, the
version of the denition above and in similar spirit everywhere below was chosen.
In contrast to the model without capital, the following result is obtained1
1A result of this type can already be found in Scheinkman (1980), see also Tirole (1985).
8Proposition 3 If there is xed capital stock and no capital income taxation, the
government cannot sustain a permanent decit of a constant fraction of total output.
Proof: Suppose, there was an equilibrium. Market clearing in the consumption
goods sector implies
(1 − )yt=2+R t(1 − )yt=(2γ)+y t=y t,t2 ;
where γ =  is the growth rate of the economy, as before. Thus the return
Rt  R, t  2
has to be a constant. Dene the fraction of saving which is capital by
't = qt=s t;
and note that then 't 2 (0 ;1) ,s i n c eq t>0and bt > 0, t  1. The condition














for t  2.N o t et h a tR
γ>0 . Consider the following three cases.
1. Suppose, that R








in contradiction to the positivity of 't:
2. Suppose, that R
γ =1 .T h e n
' t!− 1 ;
in contradiction to the positivity of 't:
3. Suppose then, that
R
γ > 1. But then the outstanding government debt outgrows
the economy and is therefore not sustainable: let
t = bt=y t
9be the debt-to-GNP ratio. The government budget constraint can be rewritten
as




Since t−1  0, t  1, >0implies t !1 . This is impossible, since by
capital market clearing and qt > 0, we need to have t  1:
Since these three cases exhaust all possibilities, an equilibrium cannot exist. 
After some thought, the result is actually not that surprising: the value of the
capital as well as the value of labor keep growing at the rate of the overall growth
rate of the economy. But that means that the rate of return on capital must be even
higher, i:e. it must be the case that
R>γ :
But then the outstanding debt grows faster than the economy and there is no way
that output can catch up any more.
Given that intuition, the return on capital is somehow too high to make a decit
sustainable. So why not give the government some instrument to lower the return on
capital. That will ease the debt problem as well! It is therefore natural to consider a
capital income tax or savings tax.
4 Model 3: xed capital stock and capital income
tax
A capital income tax in this model is a tax on the net return on capital. In order to
keep the notation simple, a tax rate  on the entire return on capital is introduced.
Both formulations are equivalent, if capital income tax rates are allowed to exceed
100 % (It turns out that they would need to for the numerical examples presented
below. Whether this is reasonable will be discussed in the last section before the
conclusion).
Since the focus in this paper is on the sustainability of a permanent decit and
therefore the eects of the elements in our model with respect to that, the tax is
not used towards reducing the decit, but simply increases government consumption.
Also, the tax is not imposed on the return on government bonds for convenience.
Otherwise, let the government use the tax on the bond returns to repay its bonds:
10the resultis equivalentto the economybelow exceptthat the return on the government
bonds is simply higher by the tax rate. Taxing government bonds just amounts to
rewriting the government bugdet constraint in another way by doing the accounting
dierently.
A steady state equilibrium is given by numbers >0 ; >0, R>0, >0




bt = y t ;
s t = y t ;
R t = R;
qt = y t;
it is the case that
1. for each t, t =1 ; 2 ;:::, the agent born at t, maximizes his utility at c1t and
c2t+1 = Rt+1st, given the budget constraint:
c1t + st =( 1− ) y t;
2. the government budget constraint is satised:
bt = gt + Rtbt−1 (5)
3. markets clear:
(a) the consumption goods market
c1t + c2t + gt + (yt + qt)=y t (6)
(b) the capital market
st = qt + bt; (7)
4. no arbitrage:
Rt =( 1−)(y t+q t) =qt−1: (8)
Using the decision rules of the agent resulting from his maximization problem as
well as substituting bt by yt, etc., equations (5) through (8) can be rewritten as











+  + ( + ) = 1 (10)
1 − 
2






+1 ) ; (12)
which, by Walras law, must be dependent. Therefore equations (9), (11) and (12)
can be used to solve for the unknown parameters , , R and  under the positivity
restrictions. It turns out that there is one degree of freedom: ideally, one would then
x the tax rate  and solve for the other three variables. It is more convenient to x



































Substituting these three formulas into (10) and checking that it holds for any value of
R in the range described above can be used to verify the calculations. The qualitative
insight is summarized by
Proposition 4 With a xed capital stock and capital income taxation, there is a







with corresponding capital income tax rates, so that the government decit is sustain-
able forever.
The formula above allows for examining the behaviour of the capital income tax
rate for various levels of  and R. As for the dependence on R, graphs are presented
in gures 1 and 2 with  = :10,  = :3a n d=( 1 : 03)25 to get results which



























Figure 1: The capital income tax rate  in the case of a xed capital stock in depen-
dence of the equilibrium return R. Parameters are  = :10,  = :3a n d=( 1 : 03)25.
Note, how there are two equilibrium returns R for any given  in the appropriate
range.












FIGURE 2: The Capital Income Tax Rate (Fixed Capital Stock)




















Figure 2: The annualized capital income tax rate 1−(1−)(1=25) in the case of a xed
capital stock in dependence of the annualized equilibrium return R1=25. Parameters
are  = :10,  = :3a n d=( 1 : 03)25. Note, how there are two equilibrium returns R
for any given  in the appropriate range.























Primary deficit as fraction of GNP (alpha)
Figure 3: The minimal capital income tax rate sustaining the permanent primary
decit yt.
15are somewhat suggestive: a generation is thought of living 25 years, while young
and accumulating wealth through labor, and 25 years, while old and consuming the
returns to their investment. Figure 1 (and all following gures except for gure 2)
shows the relationship between the total tax rate on capital gains after 25 years and
the return over 25 years. Figure 2 annualizes these numbers, determining the tax rate
needed each year to compound to the total tax rate shown in gure 1 in 25 years,
likewise for the return. In gure 2, we have shown only a part of the range of possible
values for the annualized return R1=25. Note in both gures, that the tax rate  rst
falls and then rises again. This can be shown analytically to be correct. Furthermore,
at a given tax rate, there will be typically two steady state equilibria (if at all), which
are Pareto ordered2. These results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 1. The tax rate  converges to 1 as the return R approaches its
maximal or its minimal value supporting a steady state equilibrium with decit
;
2. The tax rate  rst falls and then rises again as the gross interest rate is in-
creased from its minimal to its maximal value. There is a unique minimum tax
rate min:
3. For each tax rate  between min and 1.0, there are two steady state equilibria,
one with a lower return R than the other one.
4. The steady state allocations are Pareto ordered: Welfare increases as the return
R increases.
The proof for this proposition is in the appendix. Note from the gures that
the capital income tax necessary to sustain a government decit forever is very large
(especially taking into account that  here is really the tax on total earnings on
capital, not just on the gain). One might conjecture that the minimal capital income
tax necessary to sustain a government decit  converges to zero as  approaches
zero. That this is not so is demonstrated in gure 3 (for the same parameters as for
gure 1) and by the following proposition.
2Note, that this is a Pareto ordering of dierent steady states. In particular, the intially old agent
is endowed dierently in these dierent steady states, making this welfare comparison potentially
misleading.
16Proposition 6 The minimal tax rate which sustains a permanent decit is bound














Since for xed R,  is increasing in  a n dd e  n e df o r=0 , it follows that














proving the claim. 
The intuition, that  ! 0a n d!0 is wrong because, without , no government
decit is sustainable: R=γ ends up being strictly bigger than 1. In order to get
sustainability, R=γ has to be supressed strictly below one no matter how small the
decit is that is to be sustained.
The possibility for capital income taxation brings back the possibility for sus-
tainable decits by depressing the return on private capital suciently far. Capital
income taxes are usually attacked by economists for their undesirable eects on the
eciency of an economic system (see, for example, Lucas (1990)), although they can
potentially have benecial eects in the context of overlapping generation models,
see Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996). A closer look at this issue is taken in the next vari-
ation of our basic model in which now the temporary capital stock is the result of
depreciation and investment.
5 Model 4: variable capital stock and capital in-
come taxation.
L e ti tb et h ec a s et h a t
k t=( 1− ) k t − 1+x t;
17where  2 [0; 1) is the rate of depreciation, xt is investment and kt is the capital stock







The steady state growth rate is now no longer  − 1, since the capital stock
will be growing as well. Also, it is necessary to calculate the value of the entire
capital stock after dividends and depreciation, but before investment: the symbol
qante
t is introduced for that. As before, the capital income tax revenues are used for
additional government spending and not towards reducing the decit.
A steady state equilibrium is given by numbers γ>0, , >0, >0, >0,




xt = y t ;
k t = y t;
b t = y t ;
s t = y t ;
R t = R;
qt = y t;
q ante
t = anteyt;
it is the case that
1. for each t, t =1 ; 2 ;:::, the agent born at t, maximizes his utility at c1t and
c2t+1 = Rt+1st, given the budget constraint:
c1t + st =( 1− ) y t;
2. the government budget constraint is satised:
bt = gt + Rtbt−1 (13)
3. markets clear:
(a) the consumption goods market
c1t + c2t + gt + (yt + q
ante
t )+x t=y t (14)
18(b) the capital market
st = qt + bt; (15)
4. no arbitrage:





t + xt = qt (17)
qt = kt (18)
5. the production function for capital holds
kt =( 1− ) k t − 1+x t (19)
Equation (17) and (18) result from the denition of qante
t and the fact that the
consumption good and the investment good are the same: both equations could be
arrived at more fundamentally by focusing on the appropriate production technology,
which transfers consumption goods into investment goods one for one and vice versa.
From the production function for output and the fact that capital is a constant












That is, the growth rate in this economy is a function of , the growth rate of the
underlying productivity parameter, and , the capital share, and nothing else. Neither
the budget decit nor the capital income tax nor the interest rate have an impact
on steady state growth. This is not the result of the particular utility function we
used, but rather a standard result within models of the neoclassical growth variety,
as can easily be seen from the derivation above: we should not expect the growth rate
being changed by the capital income tax rate here. This would, of course, change in
a model with endogenous growth.
However, the level eects of the capital income tax rate can be sizeable. They are
derived now. Using the decision rules of the agent resulting from his maximization
problem as well as substituting bt by yt, etc., we can rewrite equations (13) through
19(18) as above as






























which, again, by Walras law, must be dependent. Thus, leaving away equation (20),
the parameters , , ;R;;ante and  can be solved for under the positivity restric-
tions via the remaining equations. As before the solutions are parameterizable by the














































which can be substituted into (20) to check the validity of the solution. The changes
to the solution with the xed capital stock are minor: e:g. the discount rate now
enters the formula for the tax rate.
For  =  =  = 0, we obtain a benchmark version of this model, in which there










20and the steady state capital is given by  =
1−
2 . This benchmark economy is already
dynamically inecient, if the benchmark return R is smaller than the growth factor
γ:
One immediate implication of this analysis is to gure out the eect of the capital
income tax rate, which corresponds to a certain return, on the steady state path
of output. For that, the solution above can simply be plugged into the formula for
output in period 1














One can easily see the level eect: a higher  depresses the output in the rst period
and thus in all subsequent periods, because a higher  depresses the capital-to-output
ratio .
Figure 4 repeats gure 1 with the same parameters and additionally the parameter
 =1−(1−:1)25 corresponding to a yearly depreciation of the capital stock of 10 %,
where the capital stock is now variable (and the growth rate higher). It turns out,
that the benchmark economy without a government is dynamically ecient for these
parameters: R >γ . Note, that the solution for the supporting capital income tax
did not change too much when compared to gure 1. Figure 5 plots y1 (in percent of
the level of rst period output in the benchmark version) as a function of the return
R in the relevant range. Figure 5 clearly shows, that output is a decreasing function
of the return R, which can also be easily derived from looking at the equations above.
Thus, with variable capital, output is not maximized at the minimum capital
income tax which makes the decit sustainable, but rather at a capital income tax,
which approaches 1 and a return which approaches zero. The intuition for this result
is clear by looking at the algebra of how it is derived. A higher interest rate drives up
the debt-to-GNP ratio . This in turn drives down the amount of savings in the form
of capital as a fraction of GNP, which is given by the parameter  or  : since total
savings as a fraction of GNP remain constant, government debt crowds out capital.
Finally, the level of output is increasing with the capital-output ratio  : it is here,
where the ratios expressing everything in terms of total GNP aect total GNP itself.
To sum up, higher interest rates let government debt crowd out capital as a means
of savings, thus lowering total output which needs capital as a productive factor. It
is important to realize, that this is a steady state comparison. Nothing is said here
about what will happen in these economies if the capital income tax is unexpectedly























Figure 4: The capital income tax rate  in the case of a variable capital stock in
dependence of the annualized equilibrium return R. The economy is dynamically
ecient. Parameters are  = :10,  = :3,  =1−(1 − :1)25 and  =( 1 : 03)25.N o t e ,
how there are again two equilibrium returns R for any given  in the appropriate
range.








































Figure 5: Equilibrium output in dependence of the annualized equilibrium return R
in case of a variable capital stock. The economy is dynamically ecient. Parameters,
as above, are  = :10,  = :3,  =1−(1 − :1)25 and  =( 1 : 03)25.
23raised forever to a new level. The conclusion that a high capital income tax leads
to maximal output is dangerous for another reason in this model too, of course: for
a given capital income tax, there are typically two equilibria, one with a low and
one with a high return, and the high return equilibrium for a capital income tax
approaching one delivers the worst steady state output of all.
For welfare calculations, output is not the relevant measure, but rather utility, in
which the return is of relevance. Up to a factor, which depends only on the time t,
steady state welfare for each two-period lived generation is given by
W =2l o g (
1−
2
y 1)+l o g ( R ) :
The welfare for the initally old generation is calculated as




by stationarity. Both functions are plotted in gure 6. It turns out, that the equi-
libria are no longer as nicely Pareto ordered as in the situation without investment.
Anticipating proposition 7, we can also plot the welfare-maximizing capital income
tax rate as a function of the primary decit parameter , see gure 7. As one can
see, that tax rate can become quite substantial.
We now chose parameters so that the benchmark economy is dynamically ine-
cient: we chose  = :15. For small , it then turns out, that a permanent decit is
sustainable even for a negative capital income tax (i:e. for a savings subsidy) and
furthermore, that welfare can improve due the decit. This is shown in gures 8, 9,
10 and 11, which correspond to the gures 4, 5, 6 and 7 described above. Note, in
particular, that welfare can even improve when compared to the benchmark econ-
omy with a government and without a government decit. This is of course just a
restatement of Diamonds (1965) insight.
Some of the theoretical facts are stated in the next proposition. It is important
to keep in mind for these gures as well as for the following proposition, that this is
a comparison across steady states: in particular, the endowment of the initial old is
changing in this comparison. Furthermore, it is important to note, that dierent cap-
ital income taxes mean dierent total government expenditures. A complete welfare
analysis will have to take that into account, if the goods purchased by the government
enter the utility function of the agent.
Proposition 7 1. The welfare of the initial old has a global maximum in the range
of returns sustaining a decit at a return Rmax;1. The welfare of the initial old





































Figure 6: Equilibrium welfare of the two-period lived as well as the initially old in
dependence of the annualized equilibrium return R in case of a variable capital stock.
The economy is dynamically ecient. Parameters, as above, are  = :10,  = :3,
 =1−(1 − :1)25 and  =( 1 : 03)25.








FIGURE 7: Optimal Cap. Inc. Tax (Variab. Cap., dyn. eff)

































Figure 7: Welfare-maximizing capital income tax rate in dependence of the primary
decit yt in the case of a variable capital stock. The economy is dynamically ecient,
except for very small values of , where the optimal capital income tax rate isnegative.
Parameters, as above, are  = :3,  =1−(1 − :1)25 and  =( 1 : 03)25.



























Figure 8: The capital income tax rate  in the case of a variable capital stock in
dependence of the annualized equilibrium return R. The economy is dynamically
inecient. Parameters are  = :10,  = :15,  =1−(1−:1)25 and  =( 1 : 03)25.N o t e ,
how there are again two equilibrium returns R for any given  in the appropriate
range.









































Figure 9: Equilibrium output in dependence of the annualized equilibriumreturn R in
case of a variable capital stock. The economy is dynamically inecient. Parameters,
as above, are  = :10,  = :15,  =1−(1 − :1)25 and  =( 1 : 03)25.





































Figure 10: Equilibrium welfare of the two-period lived as well as the initially old in
dependence of the annualized equilibrium return R in case of a variable capital stock.
The economy is dynamically inecient. Parameters, as above, are  = :10,  = :15,
 =1−(1 − :1)25 and  =( 1 : 03)25.








FIGURE 11: Optimal Cap. Inc. Tax (Variab. Cap., dyn. ineff)

































Figure 11: Welfare-maximizing capital income tax rate in dependence of the primary
decit yt in the case of a variable capital stock. The economy is dynamically inef-
cient, except for larger values of , which imply an optimal positive capital income
tax rate. Parameters, as above, are  = :15,  =1−(1 − :1)25 and  =( 1 : 03)25.
30is increasing in R for R smaller than this maximizing return and decreasing in
R for R bigger than Rmax;1:
2. The welfare of the two period lived agents has a global maximum in the range
of returns sustaining a decit at a return Rmax;2, which is smaller than the
return Rmax;1. The welfare of the two period lived agents is increasing in R for
R smaller than this maximizing return and decreasing in R for R bigger than
Rmax;2:
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition behind this result should be clear,
however. Consider again the model with a xed capital stock and no investment.
There, welfare was unambigously increasing in the return, because total output does
not change, consumption and savings in the rst period of the live stay the same,
but second period consumption increases with the return on the constant savings. In
the model here, where the capital stock is variable, this eect is counteracted by the
decrease of output at higher returns for the reasons explained above. Overall then,
the rst eect is more important for very small returns: in essence, second period
consumption rises faster than output declines. Eventually, however, the crowding-out
eect starts to take over, resulting in declining welfare, as the return becomes too big.
Associated with the return Rmax;2, which makes all the two-period lived agents best
o, is a capital income tax rate which can be calculated from the formulas above and
the formulas given in the proof of proposition 7. Leaving out the initial old (which
could be motivated with a social welfare function which aims at assigning the same
weight to all generations), this capital income tax may be considered optimal, given
that the decit needs to be sustained forever. Note, that this tax will in general
be quite substantial. This conclusion still holds true, if a social welfare function
assigns weight to the initial old generation as well: in general, the maximizing tax
rate will correspond to a return somewhere between Rmax;2 and Rmax;1: The welfare-
maximizing tax rate has been plotted in gures 7 and 11 as a function of the primary
decit parameter  for the two parameterizations used: note, how the tax rate can
vary between a negative number in the case of a dynamically inecient economy to
a quite substantial positive number (with  = 1 corresponding to conscation).
6 Interpretation.
To what extent are the arguments brought forward in this paper relevant for the
current situation of the Netherlands, say? It should be noted, that even though the
31numbers were picked to be suggestive, a more careful calibration would be necessary
before drawing reliable conclusions. One insight from the numerical experiments is
that the capital income tax necessary to sustain a decit is very sensitive in particular
to the capital share and to the decit that needs to be sustained, when the benchmark
economy is dynamically inecient. The more reasonable choices for the parameters,
however, seem to imply capital income taxes which are very high. This may give rise
to worry about the applicability of the results presented here.
However, a few remarks may be in order in defense of these numbers. First of all, it
actually may be the case that the realized capital income taxes in the Netherlands are
very high indeed, simply because the taxation is not indexed by a price-deﬂator: if,
say, inﬂation and not real appreciation has trippled the price of some asset, a capital
gains tax of, say, 50 percent amounts to a tax of 33 percent on the original value
of the asset. Furthermore, even if the government does not impose the extremely
high capital income tax rates implied by the model, it certainly depresses the market
interest rate, thereby easing the burden of debt, even though the government may
not be able to sustain its decit level forever. This point is possibly well understood
by governments, which seem to have great diculties in reducing the debt and at the
same time are often reluctant to remove the capital income tax.
7 Conclusions
It was examined, whether a government can run a decit forever as a fraction of
total output in several overlapping generations models with growth by rolling over
its debt. The answer is \yes" for the model without capital, \no" for the model
with capital, but \yes" for the model with capital and capital income taxation. The
impact on steady state output and welfare by the capital income taxes that make
a permanent government decit sustainable was analyzed. It was shown that for a
certain range of capital income taxes, there are two equilibria: one with a low return
on savings and one with a high return on savings. For the low return equilibria,
output is an increasing function of the capital income tax, whereas for the high
interest rate equilibria, output is a decreasing function of the capital income tax.
It was demonstrated, that output in the version of the model with investment was
maximized at a capital income tax rate approaching 100 %, if the economy can be in
the low return equilibrium. While welfare is not maximized at this point, it is still
true that the welfare maximizing capital income tax may be very substantial, given
32that a government decit needs to be sustained forever.
33Appendix
Proof: Proof of Proposition 5.
1. is clear from looking at the formula for  and letting R=γ approach 0 and 1− 2
1−
respectively
2. It is clear, that <1for the range of admissable gross interest rates R.I tt h u s
remains to show that the derivative
d
dR has a unique zero in this range. In order







 =(  −  +1 )=




noting that <(and thus >1) in order to have a nonempty range of
interest rates to sustain a decit in equilibrium to begin with. Then
(z)=1 −














where z 2 (0 ; 1 ): it suces to show, that 0(z) has a unique zero in the unit
interval. Note, that 0(z)=0on this interval is equivalent to























343. follows immediately from part 2. (d)
4. follows from observing that
u(c1t)+u ( c 2 t +1)=2l o g ( y t= 2) + log(R)
for t  1 and
u(c20)=l o g ( y 1= (2γ)) + log(R)
for the initial old.

Proof: Proof of Proposition 7.
Note, that the welfare function for both, the initially old and the two-period lived
agents, is given by
W(R)=l o g ( R )+' log(y1)
up to an additive term, where ' equals 1 for the inital old and ' equals two for the
two-period lived agents (for a social welfare function, which weighs together all utility
functions, ' will be somewhere between one and two). Taking the derivative with











(1 − )(1 −
R
γ ) − 2
=
R2



































Some more algebra then reveals that only the lower root lies within the admissable
range, that the quadratic in the numerator positive in this range for R=γ below this
root and negative above it and that the lower root is a decreasing function of '.T h i s
nishes the proof. 
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